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Kondratieff Waves, Technological 
Modes, and the Theory of Production 
Revolutions* 
  
Leonid E. Grinin 
 
Abstract 
In the present article Kondratieff waves theory is considered in comparison 
with the theory of production revolutions which analyzes the regularities of the 
major technological breakthroughs in history. Both theories analyze the pro-
cesses of cyclic nature related to the innovative technological development of 
the World-System. The mutual comparison of both theories allows the author to 
make important clarifications in understanding of the long-wave dynamics as a 
whole, as well as to give relevant explanations of the peculiarities of the un-
folding of each of the five waves and their phases, to make forecasts about the 
sixth wave and the development of technologies of the sixth technological 
mode. The special attention is paid to the analysis of aspects and limitations  
of the theory of technological modes, as it is used by many researchers to ex-
plain the causes of the long-wave dynamics. 
Keywords: production revolution, Agrarian Revolution, Industrial Revolution, 
Cybernetic Revolution, production principle, Kondratieff waves, long waves, 
phases of long waves, technological innovations, technological mode, World-
System, service sector, complex service sector.  
Preliminary Remarks on the Intent and the Structure of 
the Article 
The movement towards qualitatively new (including innovative) forms cannot 
continue endlessly and in a linear and smooth manner. It always proceeds with 
limitations, accompanied by the emerging imbalances, increasing resistance to 
environmental constraints, and competition for resources, etc. These endless 
attempts to overcome the resistance of the environment created conditions for a 
more or less noticeable advancement in particular societies and in the World-
                                                          
* This article is an output of a research project implemented as a part of the Basic Research Pro-
gram at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2019 with sup-
port by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 17-02-00521-OGN).   
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System as a whole. However, relatively short periods of rapid growth (which 
could be expressed as a linear, exponential or hyperbolic trend) tended to be 
followed by stagnation, different types of crises and setbacks which led to the 
creation of complex patterns of historical dynamics, within which trend  
and cyclical components were usually interwoven in intricate ways (see, e.g., 
Grinin and Korotayev 2010; Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2010; Korotayev 
and Grinin 2012; Grinin and Korotayev 2014; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch 
2016; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2016). Hence, in history we see a constant inter-
action between cyclical dynamics and dynamics of trends, including some long-
term trends. This was one of the main causes that led to the formation of cycli-
cal components and with respect to the pre-industrial epoch one can speak of 
the cycles with different duration, including millennial ones. 
The cyclical dynamics was noticed a long time ago. Already ancient histori-
ans (see, e.g., the second Chapter of Book VI of Polybius' Histories) described 
the cyclical component of historical dynamics, whereas new interesting analyses 
of such dynamics also appeared in Medieval and Early Modern periods (see, e.g., 
Ibn Khaldūn 1958 [1377], or Machiavelli 1996 [1531]). This is not surprising as 
the cyclical dynamics was dominant in the agrarian social systems. With modern-
ization, the trend dynamics became much more pronounced and, naturally, the 
students of modern societies pay more attention to these trends. 
In the industrial period when a ‘desire’ for a steady and continuous expan-
sion had become a major characteristic of the productive forces, cyclicality in 
some respects became even more evident. Th economic cycles with a character-
istic period of 7–11 years that manifest themselves in energetic booms and cri-
ses that suddenly engulf social systems have become an integral part of pro-
gressive development. However, the cycles with different duration were less 
obvious at the background of these sometimes very vivid cyclical fluctuations. 
The long cycles of 50–60 years, called Kondratieff waves, are one of the most 
intriguing and fascinating intellectual mysteries. 
The analysis of long economic cycles allows us to understand the long-
term world-system dynamics, to develop forecasts, to explain crises of the past, 
as well as the current global economic crisis. At the same time, the long cycles 
are more difficult to understand beyond the ultra-long cycles of technological 
development, which we call production principles, and which start with techno-
logical or production revolutions. The long Kondratieff cycles (and the tech- 
nological modes formed within them) can be represented as integral compo-
nents of ultra-long cycles of technological development. The comparison of 
these two types of cycles is the subject of this article. 
This paper is the first of two interrelated papers that attempt to clarify and 
develop some important aspects of the theory of long cycles, or Kondratieff 
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waves (hereinafter K-waves).1 In order to clarify and verify a number of its 
important provisions, the comparative method has been applied which in this 
case consists in sequential comparison of the main provisions of the K-wave 
theory with the conclusions and basic provisions of another theory that investi-
gates the same processes. This refers to the theory of production principles and 
production revolutions which reveals the laws and major developmental stages 
of the world productive forces, including the causes and cyclical sequence of 
the largest technological revolutions in the historical process. 
The fact that both theories analyze the processes of cyclical nature related 
to the innovative technological development of the World-System makes justi-
fied and relevant the comparison of the two theories for the purposes of obtain-
ing of the previously unknown knowledge. Interrelated verification of two in-
dependent theories increases the value of the findings and to some extent may 
even be considered as a verification procedure. 
In the first section of this article we will briefly describe the main ideas of the 
theory of production principles and production revolutions. The second part of 
the article will be devoted to the aspects and restrictions of the theory of techno-
logical modes. It is often believed that Kondratieff waves are generated by chang-
ing technological modes or paradigms and, in turn, create conditions for their 
development and change. However, this system possesses a number of aspects 
that should be clarified and extended. At the same time, we will compare the as-
sumptions of both theories since they are all closely related to innovations. We 
propose some additional ideas to the theory of technological modes which should 
be combined with the ideas about the change of economic macro-sectors associ-
ated with the change of K-waves. We show that the multifunctional character of 
the world economy is an important factor for the origin of innovation waves. 
Since the K-waves are associated only with the last two production princi-
ples – Industrial and Scientific-Cybernetic ones, within the framework of this 
study we consider the periods from the final phase of the Industrial revolution, 
i.e. from about 1730 to the present, and offer some forecasts concerning the 
development of the sixth technological mode for the next 40–50 years. 
Section 1. THE MAIN IDEAS OF THE THEORY OF PRODUC-
TION PRINCIPLES AND PRODUCTION REVOLU-
TIONS 
1.1. The Concept of Production Principles and Produc-
tion Revolutions 
We have been elaborating the theory of ultra-long cycles of technological de-
velopment (production principles and production revolutions) for over thirty 
                                                          
1 The second article will be published in the next issue of the Kondratieff Waves Yearbook. There  
is the announcement of the second article at the end of this paper. 
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years. It is presented in the most complete form in a number of our mono- 
graphs and articles which we do not refer to (e.g., Grinin 2007a, 2007b, 2012b, 
2013; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2013a, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2020a, 
2020b; Grinin A. and Grinin L. 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2015; Grinin, 
Grinin, and Korotayev 2017, 2020) but we recommend these works to our 
readers for a more detailed understanding of the theory of production princi-
ples.2 According to our theory, the whole historical process can be most ade-
quately divided into four large periods, on the basis of the change of major de-
velopmental stages of the world productive forces, which we call production 
principles. Each production principle means the transition within the frame-
work of the world-historical process (World-System) to completely new, more 
productive production systems, which eventually restructure the whole range of 
economic activities and respective relations. In other words, we speak not only 
about new technologies and economic management, but also about a (funda-
mentally) complete and worldwide change of modes of activity.  
We single out four production principles: 
1. Hunter-Gatherer;  
2. Craft-Agrarian;  
3. Trade-Industrial; 
4. Scientific-Cybernetic. 
Each production principle can be presented as a specific development cycle 
consisting of six phases (for more details see below). Table 1 provides some 
insight into the chronology of the production principle's phases, and Figs 1 and 
2 show the development of Industrial and Scientific-Cybernetic production 
principles. 
Among all various technological and production changes in history the fol-
lowing three production revolutions had the most comprehensive and far-
reaching consequences for society: 1. Agrarian or Agricultural Revolution 
which launched the transition to systemic production of food and, on this basis, 
to the complex social division of labor. This revolution is also associated with 
the use of new energy sources (animal power) and materials. 2. Industrial 
Revolution, which led to the main production concentrated on industry and 
carried out by machines and mechanisms. The significance of this revolution 
consists not only in the replacement of manual labor with machines,  and bio-
logical energy – with water and steam energy but also in the fact that it initiated 
the introduction of labor saving in a broad sense (not only in physical labor, but 
also in accounting, control, management, exchange, credit, and information 
transfer). 3. Cybernetic Revolution which originated as a scientific-informa 
                                                          
2 These ideas were briefly discussed in our contribution to the preceding volume of this Yearbook 
(Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2014: 354–377). Since they are crucial to this article, we apologize in 
advance for the inevitable repetitions that may occur. 
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tion (see below) and resulted in the emergence of efficient information technol-
ogies, new materials and types of energy, and spreading of automation. 
The Cybernetic Revolution was a great transition from the Industrial pro-
duction principle to the production and service sector based on the implemen-
tation of self-regulating systems. 
The defined revolutions are often referred to as production (technologi-
cal) revolutions. Each production revolution is the result of a long accumula-
tion of quantitative and qualitative changes that eventually bring a great evo-
lutionary breakthrough. Each one provokes an increasing complexity of the 
social division of labour and the integration of humanity. 
The above-mentioned technological thresholds in the history of societies 
have been long attracting the attention of academic community. The Industrial 
Revolution became the object of an extensive research in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries both within Marxist framework and within non-
Marxist theory (see, e.g., Engels 1955 [1845]; Marx 1960 [1867]; Plekhanov 
1956 [1895]; Labriola 1986 [1896]; Toynbee 1927 [1884]; 1956 [1884]; Man-
toux 1929). The first ideas on the Agrarian (Neolithic) revolution were intro-
duced by Gordon Childe in the 1930s, and between the 1940s and 1950s he 
developed the theory of the Neolithic revolution (Childe 1934, 1944, 1948). 
From the 1940s there was observed an increasing interest in the analysis of the 
impact of production on the historical development and historical process in 
general; meanwhile, the originating technological society received both opti-
mistic and pessimistic assessments. The interest became even more acute after 
it was perceived that the world had entered the Cybernetic Revolution (which 
in the 1950s and 1980s was denoted by different terms; thus, within some ap-
proach it was called the scientific and technological revolution following John 
Bernal [1965]). It is not surprising then that in the 1960s and 1980s the increas-
ing interest in production revolutions found its expression in numerous works 
including the publications of such postindustrial economists as Daniel Bell 
(1973, 1978, 1990), Alvin Toffler (1980, 1985, 1990; Toffler A. and Toffler H. 
1995), Tom Stonier (1983), Alain Touraine (1974, 1983), Herman Kahn 
(1983), and to a lesser extent in other scholars' works (Drucker 1995, 1996; 
Thurow 1996; see also Dizard 1982; Martin 1981; Castells 1996), not to men-
tion the philosophers of technology (Ellul 1964, 1975, 1982, 1984; Mumford 
1966; etc.; see also Inozemtsev 1999).  
Much has been written about each of the three production revolutions (see, 
e.g., Allen 2009, 2011; Bellwood 2004; Benson and Lloyd 1983; Bernal 1965; 
Cauvin 2000; Cipolla 1976; Clark 2007; Cohen 1977; Cowan and Watson 
1992; Dietz 1927; Goldstone 2009; Harris and Hillman 1989; Henderson 1961; 
Huang 2002; Ingold 1980; Knowles 1937; Lieberman 1972; Miller 1992; 
Mokyr 1985, 1990, 1993, 1999, 2010; Mokyr and Foth 2010; More 2000; 
North 1981; Philipson 1962; Phyllys 1965; Pomeranz 2000; Reed 1977; Rindos 
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1984; Sabo 1979; Shnirelman 1989, 2012а, 2012b; Smith 1976; Stearns 1993, 
1998; Sylvester and Klotz 1983). However, there is a surprisingly small number 
of studies concerning these revolutions as recurrent phenomena, each represent-
ing an extremely important landmark in the history of humankind. Meanwhile, 
the repeatability of the most important model characteristics of production rev-
olutions and especially some phases of their cycle provides a good tool for 
forecasting. We have developed a theory of production revolutions within the 
framework of the general theory of the world historical process (Grinin 2007a, 
2007b, 2012a; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2013b, 2015a, 2015b; see also Grinin 
and Korotayev 2015). 
1.2. The Structural Model of Production Revolutions  
It is obvious that each production revolution is unique and has absolutely pecu-
liar characteristics. But at the same time, there are similarities in their develop-
ment that allow creating a model of production revolution as a global and recur-
rent phenomenon. 
Within the proposed theory we suggest a fundamentally new idea that each 
production revolution has a common internal cycle consisting of three phases: 
two innovative (initial and final) and one modernization phase. During the ini-
tial innovative phase, there emerge new advanced technologies which eventual-
ly spread to other societies and territories. As a result of the final innovative 
phase of a production revolution the new production principle reaches its peak. 
Between these phases there is a modernization phase – a long and very im-
portant period when the new technologies of production principle (which ap-
peared in the initial innovative phase) are distributed, enriched, and diversified, 
thus creating prerequisites for a final innovative breakthrough.3  
Thus, the cycle of each production revolution can be described as follows: 
the initial innovative phase (emergence of a new revolutionizing production 
sector) – the modernization phase (diffusion, synthesis and improvement of 
new technologies) – the final innovative phase (when new technologies acquire 
their mature characteristics).  
The scheme of innovative phases of production revolutions in our theory is 
as follows (modernization phases are omitted). 
Agrarian Revolution: the initial innovative phase – the transition to prim-
itive manual (hoe) agriculture and animal husbandry (started about 12,000–
9,000 BP); the final – transition to irrigation agriculture (or plow agriculture 
without irrigation) (which began approximately 5.5 thousand years ago).  
Industrial Revolution: the initial innovative phase starts in the fifteenth 
century with the development of navigation, water-powered equipment and 
                                                          
3 E.g., in the modernization phase of the Agrarian Revolution local varieties of plants and breeds of 
animals (borrowed from other places) were created. 
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mechanization, with qualitative growth of labor division in the manufacturing, 
and also other processes; the final phase – the industrial revolution of the 18th  – 
the first third of the 19th century, connected with the introduction of various 
machines and steam energy.  
Cybernetic Revolution: the initial (scientific and information) phase dated 
back to the 1950–1990s. The breakthrough occurred in automation, energy pro-
duction, synthetic materials, space technologies, exploration of space and sea, 
agriculture, but especially – in the creation of electronic control facilities, com-
munication and information. The final innovative phase (of self-regulating sys-
tems) will begin in the 2030s or 2040s and will last till the 2060s or 2070s.  
Each production revolution implies a transition to a fundamentally new pro-
duction system; the beginning of each production revolution marks the borders 
between corresponding production principles.  
1.3. The Structure of a Production Principle 
A production revolution is a long-running process which is an integral part of a 
production principle. The production revolution is a fundamental technological 
breakthrough which is realized in discovery of absolutely new principles of 
creating food and other valuable mass products. These new ways of manufac-
turing (methods) mark the emergence and development of a new production 
principle which gradually changes social and economic relations. In our con-
cept we define the following large-scale (two-part) division of a production 
principle: the first part is the production revolution, the second period is maxi-
mization of the structural, systemic, and spatial potentials of the new forms of 
production (hereafter we can sometimes use the terms ‘production principle’ 
and ‘production revolution’ as synonyms). However, such a large-scale division 
is clearly insufficient for a full-fledged analysis. As mentioned above, the pro-
duction revolution, which takes up at least a half of the period of production 
principle (in fact more than a half, see Table 1) consists of three phases each 
corresponding to the first three stages of the production principle. Thus, togeth-
er with the three subsequent (post-revolutionary) phases the principle of pro-
duction is a six-phase cycle. 
1. The phase of the starting production revolution. A new and not yet de-
veloped principle of production emerges. 
2. The phase of primary modernization – diffusion and strengthening of the 
production principle.  
3. The phase of completing production revolution. The production princi-
ple acquires advanced characteristics.  
4. The phase of maturity and expansion of the production principle. In this 
phase there occurs a wide geographical and sectoral diffusion of new technolo-
gies, bringing the production principle to mature forms. A consequence of this 
phase is vast transformations in the social and economic spheres. 
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5. The phase of absolute domination of the production principle. The final 
victory of the production principle in the world yields an intensification of 
technologies, bringing opportunities to the limit of their ‘reach,’ beyond which 
crisis features appear. 
6. The stage of non-system phenomena, or a preparatory phase. The inten-
sification leads to the emergence of non-system elements which prepare the 
birth of a new production principle. Under favorable conditions these elements 
form a system and in some societies the transition to a new production principle 
will begin and the cycle will repeat at a new level.  
Table 1. Chronology of the production principle's phases  
N
o 
Pro-
duction 
Prin-
ciple  
1st  
phase 
2nd  
phase 
3rd  
phase 
4th  
phase  
5th  
phase 
6th  
phase 
Total 
Produc-
tion  
Principle  
1. Hunter-
Gather-
er  
40,000– 
30,000 
(38,000– 
28,000 BC) 
 
10 
30,000– 
22,000 
(28,000– 
20,000 BC)
 
8 
22,000– 
17,000 
(20,000– 
15,000 BC)
 
5 
17,000– 
14,000 
(15,000– 
12,000 BC)
 
3 
14,000– 
11,500 
(12,000– 
9,500 BC)
 
2.5 
11,500– 
10,000 
(9,500– 
8,000 BC)
 
1.5 
40,000– 
10,000 
(38,000– 
8000 BC) 
 
30 
2. Craft-
Agra-
rian  
10,000– 
7,300 
(8,000– 
5,300 BC) 
 
2.7 
7,300– 
5,000 
(5,300– 
3,000 BC)
 
2.3
5,000– 
3,500 
(3,000– 
1500 BC) 
 
1.5 
3500– 
2200 
(1500– 
200 BC) 
 
1.3 
2200– 
1200 
(200 BC –
800 AD) 
 
1.0 
800– 
1430 AD 
 
 
 
0.6 
10,000–570 
(8,000 BC – 
1430 AD) 
 
 
9.4 
3. Indust-
rial 
1430– 
1600 
 
0.17 
1600– 
1730 
 
0.13 
1730– 
1830 
 
0.1 
1830– 
1890 
 
0.06 
1890– 
1929 
 
0.04 
1929– 
1955 
 
0.025 
1430–1955 
 
 
0.525 
4. Scien-
tific-
Cyber-
netic  
1955– 
1995/2000 
 
0.04–0.045 
1995– 
2030/40 
 
0.035–0.04
2030/40– 
2055/70 
 
0.025–0.03
2055/70– 
2070/90 
 
0.015–0.02
2070/90–
2080/105 
 
0.01–0.015
2080/2105–
2090/2115 
 
0.01 
1955– 
2090/2115 
 
0.135–0.160 
Note: Figures before the brackets – absolute scale (BP), figures in the brackets – BCE. Chronology in the 
table is simplified (for a more detailed chronology see Grinin 2006b, 2009; Grinin and Korotayev 2013, 
2015; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015, 2016). The duration of phases (in thousand year intervals) is marked 
by the bold-face type. Duration of phases of the scientific-cybernetic production principle is hypothetical.  
1.4. A Brief Chronology of Industrial and Scientific-
Cybernetic Production Principles  
Since in the context of this paper we are primarily interested in the last two 
production principles – industrial and scientific-cybernetic, we will briefly pre-
sent their chronology and two diagrams (Figs 1 and 2). 
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The beginning of the initial phase of the Industrial Revolution may be dated  
to the period from the second third of the 15th century to the late 16th cen- 
tury. At first there were major changes in agriculture, cloth manufacturing, and 
navigation. Then came to the forefront those types of activities that were both 
more open to innovation and capable of accumulating more surplus product: 
long-distance trade and colonial activities, which had become more and more 
interwoven since the 16th century. Besides, at that time, primitive industries (yet 
particularly industries) developed in certain fields. It is during that period when 
according to Wallerstein (1974) the capitalist world-economy was formed.  
From the end of the 16th century to the first third of the 18th century there 
was the second (primary modernization) phase of the industrial production 
principle accompanied with the development of labor division and mechani-
zation; it was the period of growth and development of new sectors (central-
ized and especially distributed manufacturing, shipbuilding, long-distance 
trade) until they became leading in some societies. It was also the period of 
great success in agricultural production which made it possible for the first 
time in human history to create an economic system in which the growth of 
food production would eventually outpace population growth. It was the be-
ginning of the escape from the Malthusian trap (see Grinin, Korotayev, and 
Malkov 2008; Grinin and Korotayev 2012, 2015). 
The third phase of the Industrial production principle together with the fi-
nal phase of the Industrial Revolution began in the 1730s in England and was 
accompanied by the creation of sectors with the machine cycle of production 
and the use of steam power. The manual labor was replaced by machine labor 
in cotton textile industry that was only emerging in England (Mantoux 1929; 
Berlanstein 1992; Mokyr 1993, 1999; Allen 2009, 2011; Griffin 2010; Grinin 
and Korotayev 2015). There appeared tens of thousands of mechanical wea- 
ving and spinning machines as well as machines that perform other operations 
in the textile industry. Already in the 1880s, James Watt's steam engine was 
introduced, and the number of steam engines in the first decades of the 19th 
century amounted about several thousands. There emerged a fundamentally 
new branch of industry – mechanical engineering. The British Industrial Revo-
lution was mainly completed in the 1830s. One could already observe success-
ful industrialization in a number of countries. There started major demographic 
changes connected with the entrance of a huge number of human populations 
into the first phase of the demographic transition (Armengaud 1976; Min-
ghinton 1976: 85–89; Chesnais 1992; Vishnevsky 1976, 2005). 
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Fig. 1. The development of the Industrial production principle 
The fourth phase (1830 – the 1890s) is the period of development of heavy 
industry, emergence of new methods of iron and steel smelting, chemical indus-
try, rapid railway construction, and most significantly it is the period of final 
replacement of manual labor by machines production and its intensive diffusion 
not only in the field of production but also in transport and communication sys-
tem. Unlike previous periods, mechanical engineering matured and the accura-
cy of machine and component manufacturing  significantly improved (up to 
a fraction of millimeters, sometimes up to a hundredth or even a thousandth of a mil-
limetre), which is clearly visible in weapons manufacture. It is a period of unbe-
lievable number of innovations (see Bunch and Hellemans 2004; Korotayev 
and Grinin 2017). 
The fifth phase covered the period from the end of the 19th century to the 
beginning of the Great Depression of the 1930s. During that period significant 
changes took place (for more details see Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015b, 2016). 
The chemical industry (including artificial fertilizers, organics and the first arti-
ficial materials) experienced vigorous development, a breakthrough was ob-
served in steel production, the extensive use of electricity (together with oil) 
would gradually replace coal. The introduction of electric engines fundamental-
ly changed the functioning of factories and everyday life. There appeared ma-
chines with the internal combustion engine which were able to act autonomous-
ly and this led to revolution in agriculture. Due to the introduction of assembly 
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line, automobile manufacturing rose vigorously. It was a period of the first 
electronics innovations. With the advent of aviation we managed to subdue the 
air element, and with the invention of radio one could observe the breakthrough 
in the field of communication and control. 
The sixth phase lasted until the middle of the 20th century. The period of 
the 1930s gave a great number of basic innovations, many of which were im-
plemented in 1940 – the 1970s. There were developing the advanced branches 
of mechanical engineering (including electric, automotive, aeronautical engi-
neering, heavy, agricultural machinery, etc.), which took the lead in heavy in-
dustry. This phase was marked by a powerful intensification of production, 
introduction of scientific methods, development of standardization and the en-
largement of production units. A vigorous intensification of production and the 
introduction of scientific methods of its organization took place during this pe-
riod. There was an unprecedented development of standardization and the en-
largement of production units. At that period the precursors of the Cybernetic 
revolution became more and more evident in the field of television, rocket and 
missile engineering, atomic energy.  
The production revolution which began in the 1950s and is still proceed-
ing, has led to a powerful acceleration of scientific and technological progress. 
Taking into account the two innovative phases of this revolution and expected 
changes in the next five decades, it is relevant to denote this revolution as ‘Cy-
bernetic’ (see our explanation below). The initial phase of this revolution (the 
1950s – the 1990s) can be referred to as a scientific-information phase since it 
was characterized by the transition to scientific methods of planning, forecast-
ing, marketing, logistics, production management, distribution and circulation 
of resources, and communication.4 The most radical changes took place in the 
sphere of computer science and information technologies. Besides, the Cyber-
netic revolution occurred in energy production, synthetic materials, automation, 
space technologies, exploration of space and sea, and agriculture. 
The Scientific-Cybernetic production principle is in the early stages of its 
development. Its first phase has finished, and in the mid-1990s the second 
phase started. This principle is marked by a wide diffusion of user-friendly 
computers, communication technologies as well as new financial technologies 
which widely promote and exponentially increase the financial instruments of 
the second, third and subsequent orders (including so-called derivatives). At the 
same time, financial and economic globalization has intensified, followed by 
other vectors of globalization. The second phase is in progress now. Table 1 
and Fig. 2 present the calculated duration of the future phases. 
                                                          
4 At the same time, it is important to note that the concept ‘scientific’ does not imply only a positive 
assessment; it refers only to the technology of influence. And the results and objectives of ‘scien-
tific’ impact may be very different. 
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Fig. 2. Development of the Scientific-Cybernetic production principle 
Note: The dashed line represents one of the scenarios of predicted development of the 
Scientific-Cybernetic production principle and corresponds to the dates before the slash 
in the fifth column of Table 1. 
The third phase is likely to start approximately in the 2030s – the 2040s. At this 
particular period the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution should start. We 
assume that the ‘essence’ of this revolution will coincide with the name which 
was given to its final phase, i.e. it will become the revolution of self-regulating 
systems (see Grinin 2003, 2006а, 2007a; Grinin A. and Grinin L. 2015; Grinin L. 
and Grinin A. 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Grinin et al. 
2017; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch 2016). Below we will give an explanation 
to this concept. This phase may be launched as a result of some specific trans-
formations. Let us recall that the Industrial revolution began in a peculiar area 
of the textile manufactory – cotton production – with the solution of quite spe-
cific problems: liquidation of the gap between spinning and weaving, and then, 
after increasing weavers' productivity, searching for the ways to mechanize 
spinning. However, the solution of these narrow tasks caused an explosion of 
innovations conditioned by the existence of a large number of the major ele-
ments of machine production (including abundant mechanisms, primitive steam 
engines, quite a high volume of coal production, etc.) which gave an impetus to 
the development of the Industrial Revolution. 
We assume that the Cybernetic Revolution will first start in some specific 
area. Given the general vector of scientific achievements and technological 
development and taking into account that a future breakthrough area should be 
highly commercially attractive and have a wide market, we forecast that the 
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final phase of this revolution will begin somewhere at the intersection of medi-
cal technologies, biotechnologies and gene engineering (perhaps, with the in-
volvement of nanotechnologies). Certainly, it is almost impossible to predict 
how innovations will develop in future. However, the general vector of break-
through can be defined as a rapid growth of opportunities for correction or even 
modification of the human biological nature.5 In other words, it will become 
possible to extend our opportunities to alter human body, perhaps, to some ex-
tent, its genome; to extend sharply our opportunities of minimally invasive in-
fluence and operations instead of the modern surgical ones; to use extensively 
means of cultivating separate biological materials, bodies or their parts and 
elements for regeneration and rehabilitation of an organism, and also artificial 
analogues of biological material (bodies, receptors), etc. This will make it pos-
sible to radically expand the opportunities to prolong life and improve its bio-
logical quality. These will be technologies intended for common use. Certainly, 
it will take a rather long period (about two or three decades) from the first steps 
in that direction (in the 2030–2040s) to their common use. 
The first steps of the new revolution should produce a synergetic effect in a 
number of other directions, resulting in a new level (and a new large sector) of 
production with special characteristics. Based on the trends that have already 
developed during the Cybernetic revolution, as well as on advanced discoveries 
and innovations in various fields (genetics, medicine, biotechnology, nanotech-
nology, programming, AI, manufacture of customized goods, etc.), we assume 
that the future revolution will be the following most important characteristics 
which have already become evident today but which will be realized in their 
mature and mass forms only in the future. 
The most important characteristics and trends of the Cybernetic 
Revolution are:  
1. The increasing amounts of information and complication of information 
processing (including the capacity of the systems for independent 
communication and interaction). 
2. Sustainably developing system of regulation and self-regulation.  
3. Mass use of artificial materials with previously lacking properties. 
4. Qualitatively growing controllability: a) of systems and processes of var-
ious nature (including living material); and b) of new levels of organization of 
matter (up to sub-atomic level and usage of tiny particles as building blocks). 
5. Miniaturization and microtization as a trend of a constantly decreasing 
size of particles, mechanisms, electronic devices, implants, etc. 
6. Resource and energy saving in every sphere. 
                                                          
5 To a large extent this can take place on the basis of the qualitative growth of the possibilities of 
modification of any living organism from bacteria to mammals. Modified elements of such organ-
isms can even serve as a material for use in the human body, e.g., antibodies (in medicine animals 
have long been used to obtain blood serum, necessary for the vaccine manufacture). 
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7. Individualization/personalization as one of the most important techno-
logical trends.  
8. Implementation of smart technologies and the humanization of their 
functions (use of common language, voice, etc.). 
9. Control over human behaviour and activity to eliminate the negative in-
fluence of the so-called human factor.6  
The characteristics of technologies of the Cybernetic Revolution: 
1. The transformation and analysis of information as an essential part of 
technologies.  
2. The increasing connection between technological systems and environ-
ment.  
3. A trend towards autonomation and automation of control along with an 
increasing controllability and self-regulation of systems. 
4. The capabilities of materials and technologies to adjust to different objec-
tives and tasks (smart materials and technologies) as well as ability to choose 
optimal regimes for certain goals and tasks. 
5. A large-scale synthesis of materials and characteristics of the systems of 
different nature (e.g., of animate and inanimate nature). 
6. The integration of machinery, equipment and hardware with technology 
(know-how and knowledge of the process) into a unified technical and techno-
logical system.7  
7. The self-regulating systems (see below) will become the major part of 
technological process. That is the reason why the final (forthcoming) phase  
of the Cybernetic Revolution can be called the epoch of self-regulating systems 
(see below). 
Various directions of development should generate a systemic cluster of 
innovations.8 
It would be more appropriate to denote the forthcoming revolution as cy-
bernetic one first of all since its main changes will imply rapidly increasing 
opportunities to control various processes by means of creating self-regulating 
autonomous systems or through affecting the key parameters and elements that 
                                                          
6 E.g., to control human attention to prevent accidents (e.g., in transport) as well as to prevent hu-
man beings from using means of high-risk in unlawful or disease state (e.g., not allow driving a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs). 
7 During the Industrial Epoch these elements existed separately: technologies were preserved on 
paper or in engineers' minds. At present, thanks to informational and other technologies the tech-
nological constituent fulfils the managing function. And this facilitates the transition to the epoch 
of self-regulating systems.  
8 Thus, e.g., the resource and energy saving can be carried out via choosing optimal modes by the 
autonomous systems that fulfil specific goals and tasks and vice versa, the choice of an optimum 
mode will depend on the level of energy and materials consumption, and a consumer's budget. Or, 
the opportunities of self-regulation will allow choosing a particular decision for the variety of indi-
vidual tasks, orders and requests (e.g., with 3D printers and choosing of an individual program as the 
optimal one). 
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are capable to launch a necessary process, etc. As is known, Cybernetics is the 
science of control.  Secondly, as the most important vector of this revolution 
will be related to the synthesis of principles typical of all types of systems cov-
ered by Cybernetics: biological, social and technical. These principles will be 
combined in various controlled systems (including human body).   
The forthcoming phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will be connected 
with self-regulating systems which can regulate themselves, responding in pre-
programmed and intelligent way to the feedback from the environment. Today 
there are many self-regulating systems around us, for example, the artificial 
Earth satellites, pilotless planes, navigators laying the route for a driver. More-
over, there emerge self-driving electric vehicles. Another good example is life-
supporting systems (such as medical ventilation apparatus or artificial heart). 
They can regulate a number of parameters, choose the most suitable mode and 
detect critical situations. There are also special programs that determine the 
value of stocks and other securities, react to the change of their prices, buy and 
sell them, carry out thousands of operations in a day and fix a profit. A great 
number of self-regulating systems have been created. But they are mostly tech-
nical and informational systems (like robots or computer programs). During the 
final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution there will emerge a lot of self-
regulating systems connected with biology and bionics, physiology and medi-
cine, agriculture and environment. The number of such systems as well as their 
complexity and autonomous character will dramatically increase. Besides, they 
will essentially reduce energy and resources consumption. Human life will be-
come organized to a greater extent by such self-regulating systems (e.g., via 
health monitoring, regulation or recommendations concerning physical exer-
tion, diet, and other controls over the patients' condition and behaviors; pre- 
vention of illegal actions, etc.). As a result, the opportunity to control various 
natural, social, and industrial production processes without direct human inter-
vention (which is impossible or extremely limited at present) will increase. 
The fourth phase implies that in the next two decades the sector of self-
regulating systems will rapidly improve and diffuse to various regions at an 
enormous speed. MANBRIC-technologies will be finally formed and will oc-
cupy a central place in the new production principle. At the same time, this will 
be a period of significant growth in life expectancy and, accordingly (against 
the background of low fertility), a period of rapid global ageing that will also 
involve still ‘young’ regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
(Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015b, 2016; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch 2016; 
Grinin L., Grinin A., and Korotayev 2017, 2020).  
We suppose that during the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution dif-
ferent developmental trends will produce a system cluster of innovations as is 
often the case with the innovative phases of production revolutions. Thus, as for 
the forecasts for the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution in our opinion the 
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general drivers of the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will be medi-
cine, additive (3D printers), nano- and bio technologies, robotics, IT, cognitive 
sciences, which together will form a sophisticated system of self-regulating 
production. We denote this complex as MANBRIC-technologies. 
The fifth and sixth phases imply the beginning of the transition to a new 
economic system (see below) due to the increasing level of complexity of self-
regulating systems and serious advances in medicine (see above). By this time, 
the process of global ageing will affect all countries. At the same time, more 
conservative older population may influence innovation and its direction. This 
will be accompanied by profound painful changes and confrontations in socie-
ties within the World System. Also, there will be a growing number of social 
self-regulating systems that will mostly operate autonomously, regulating the 
behavior of a large number of people in certain situations. They can be used to 
create positive or negative behavioral stimuli (carrot and stick method) to regu-
late human behavior.9 This will have fundamental and contradictory conse-
quences, which can both appeal to the conservatism of the older generation or 
cause a contradictory reaction.  
 
Section 2. THE THEORY OF PRODUCTION REVOLUTIONS 
AND K-WAVES: COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
2.1. The Correlation Between Two Theories 
In this part of the article, in order to clarify some aspects of the K-waves theory 
we will consistently compare two theories with the help of the theory of pro-
duction principles and production revolutions. In the latter theory we are espe-
cially interested in the periods from the final phase of the Industrial Revolution, 
i.e. from about 1730, to the present moment with making predictions for the 
coming decades. We assume that the comparison and application of two inde-
pendent theories allows us to draw more reliable conclusions, as well as to un-
derstand some peculiarities in the unfolding of K-waves.  
What makes us believe that the comparative approach can be useful for the 
analysis of the K-waves? First, both theories to a large extent investigate  
the same object and the same period of time and space. Second, the processes 
studied by both theories have very similar developmental models and produce 
similar effect on economy and society in general. Besides, the comparison of 
the theories allows making more grounded forecasts. 
 
 
                                                          
9 Even today one can observe such regulating systems, e.g., car insurance, when a more accurate 
driver pays less. The system of total regulation of social behavior is already announced in China 
(Chin and Wong 2016).  
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The unity of the object, space and time 
Object. Both theories are related to major technological changes consid-
ered in terms of innovations and generational changes in technology that arise 
from society's aspiration to increasing production. Space and spatial structure 
are the World-System phenomena. The production principles and the Kon-
dratieff cycles are a means of dissemination of technological and world eco-
nomic innovations within the framework of the World-System. The latter is 
transformed under the influence of unfolding production revolutions and K-
waves, while the changing characteristics transform the economic characteris-
tics and, in turn, affect the rhythm of economic cycles. Time, as was men-
tioned, covers the period from the Industrial Revolution (when the manife- 
station of the Kondratieff waves in economy became more or less evident) to 
2060–2070 after these years the long-wave economic dynamics may disappear 
or significantly transform. 
Similarities in the types of processes 
Both processes: a) are of cyclical nature, and the comparison of different 
cycles occurring in the same environment (reality) can be useful; b) are associ-
ated with fluctuations (changes) of economic and technological rhythms and 
characteristics. One can even trace the following patterns: a more rapid but less 
innovative development (the modernization phases of the production principle 
and A-phases of K-waves) and a more innovative but slower one (e.g., the in-
novative phases of the production principle and B-phases of K-waves);10  
c) each new phase (wave) involves an increasingly larger part of the World-
System, and at the same time they connect and integrate to more and more full 
extent; d) the development of production principles and long-wave dynamics 
are connected with overcoming of structural technological, economic and social 
contradictions in every society and within the framework of large parts of the 
World-System as well as in the World-System as a whole. At the same time  
the compared processes unfold in a different way in the core and periphery  
of the World System. 
Similar impacts 
Both processes: a) change the entire system of organization of production, 
world trade and world economic, including monetary and financial, relations; 
b) lead to the structuring of the World-System since with every new phase 
(wave) the World-System structure may significantly and sometimes funda-
mentally change. 
                                                          
10 The theory of production principles is based on the fact that its six unfolding phases are pairs of 
innovative and modernization development. Thus, the first, third and fifth phases are innovative; 
and the second, fourth and sixth phases are modernization ones. The pauses in the rise (the slow-
down in the speed of the rise) of K-waves, i.e. B-phases, are related with the expansion of 
World-System industrial core. 
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2.2. Differences Between Objects and Situational  
Definition of K-waves 
As we have pointed, the concept of the production principle is associated with 
the analysis of the system of the established (but previously unknown) forms of 
production, which far surpass the previously existing ones (in terms of their 
major parameters such as opportunities, scale, and productivity), and in many 
respects in terms of range of manufacture, etc.). 
K-waves arise only at a certain level of societal economic development, so 
we can consider them as a specific mechanism connected with the emergence 
and development of the Industrial production principle and the means of ex-
panded reproduction of industrial economy.11 Given that each new K-wave 
does not simply repeat the wave motion, but is based on a new technological 
mode, K-waves in a certain sense can be treated as developmental phases of 
the Industrial production principle and the first phases of development of the 
Scientific-Cybernetic production principle.12 
One should realize that the production principle is not just a process, but a 
cycle consisting of an initial phase, the phase of development and wide spread 
territorial diffusion of the new system of technologies, production, systems and 
paradigms related to economic management, the maturity phase, the phase of 
emergence of the new non-system elements and its transitional crisis, culminat-
ing in the replacement by a new principle of production. 
Thus, both concepts (the K-waves and production principles) deal with a 
cyclical pattern and the development of production technologies and production 
system as a whole; their scale surpasses the limits of a single society while their 
driving forces are associated with innovations. No doubt, this evidences the 
non-accidental similarity between the two analyzed notions and provides great 
opportunities for their comparison.  
While emphasizing the similarities one should also mention the differences be-
tween theories: 
 The production principle and production revolutions are the processes 
which are relevant to the whole historical human evolution, whereas K-waves, 
in our opinion, are only characteristic of the Industrial epoch. 
 The production principle expresses the qualitative aspect of changes, 
whereas K-waves can be traced by quantitative indicators, which are created by 
various factors, including wars and inflation.  
                                                          
11 For more details see Grinin and Korotayev 2014; Grinin et al. 2014.  Grinin, Korotayev, and 
Taush 2016. 
12 After the completion of the Cybernetic Revolution approximately in the 2050–2070s, the  
K-waves, as mechanisms of economic development are likely to disappear or change their nature 
and decrease their level of significance. See about it in the second article, which will be pub-
lished in the next issue of the Yearbook ‘Kondratieff Waves’ (see also Grinin, Korotayev, and 
Tausch 2016). 
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 The innovative progress is only one aspect of K-waves along with oth-
ers, whereas each stage of production revolutions marks the transition of socie-
ty to a new state (attractor). 
 Therefore, the unfolding of a production principle is determined by the 
development of the World System core, whereas the K-waves – by averaged 
values for the World System. 
 The phases of the production principle (unlike the length of K-waves 
and their phases) are not equal, they are subject to a different dependence 
which can be expressed as follows: each subsequent phase of the production 
principle cycle is shorter than the previous one (and the total acceleration of the 
historical process shortens the duration of all phases of each subsequent pro-
duction principle by several times as compared with the previous one). 
 
Section 3. INNOVATIVE LOGICS OF ECONOMIC MODES 
3.1. Technological Modes 
Preliminary remarks. Below we will consider the theory of technological 
modes (or techno-economic paradigms; see the note 17 below) which is tightly 
connected with the theory of the long cycles. The scheme of six technological 
modes is presented below. Running ahead let us say about the connection be-
tween production principles and technological modes. Assuming that the produc-
tion principle is the development of a new system of technologies and production 
(see above), then such a cycle can also be shown as a process of the formation of 
new macro-sectors that are closely related to the long-wave dynamics. 
Schematically, this movement looks as follows. First, there appear new 
breakthrough technologies (e.g., in the cotton industry) which create a large sec-
tor with new organizational forms of production (which, in particular, corre-
sponds to the third phase of the industrial production principle, i.e. the completion 
of the production revolution). As these sectors evolve, they form a new techno-
logical mode, or a paradigm, of ‘textile industry’ (which at the same time means 
the transition of the production principle to a new phase – of maturity and expan-
sion). Further, on the basis of the next wave of innovations the second technolog-
ical mode – of ‘railway lines, coal, and steel ’– formed so that the Industrial pro-
duction principle reaches its fifth phase – the phase of absolute dominance. Final-
ly, while introducing the next-generation innovative technologies and forming the 
third technological mode (‘of electricity, chemical industry and heavy engineer-
ing’) the Industrial production principle moves to the sixth phase preparing the 
ground for the transition to a new (Scientific-Cybernetic) production principle. 
And then the technological modes are replaced along with the phases of this pro-
duction principle. We will consider this process in detail. 
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3.1.1. The concept of technological modes/paradigms 
N. D. Kondratieff also suggested the idea that the alternation of the downward 
trend with the upward trend in the long waves is characterized by an active im-
plementation of innovations (the so-called first empirical regularity [Kon-
dratieff 2002 [1926]: 370–374]). Joseph A. Schumpeter (1939) conceptually 
developed this idea and considered the uneven concentration of technological 
innovations as the main reason for long cycles (in his opinion, in the difficult 
conditions of depression, the innovative entrepreneurs more actively invest in 
the development and implementation of breakthrough innovations, which be-
come the basis for the rise in the upward phase of the K-wave). Further, this 
innovative direction was transformed into theories, according to which the most 
important explanation of the nature and pulsation of K-waves is the change of 
technological modes and / or techno-economic paradigms (about the role  
of investments and the change of these modes and paradigms see the explana-
tion of the long-wave dynamics: Mensch 1979; Kleinknecht 1981, 1987; Dick-
son 1983; Dosi 1984; Freeman 1987; Tylecote 1992; Glazyev 1993; Mayevsky 
1997; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Modelski 2001, 2006; Yakovets 2001; 
Freeman and Louçã 2001; Ayres 2006; Kleinknecht and van der Panne 2006; 
Dator 2006; Hirooka 2006; Papenhausen 2008; see also Lazurenko 1992; 
Glazyev 2009; Polterovich 2009; Perez 2002).13 
In the present article there is no point in describing the details of differ-
ences (sometimes quite significant) in the approaches of the above-mentioned 
researchers. When summarizing them, the main idea is as follows. Every sub-
sequent K-wave is caused by the upsurge in the rate of basic technological in-
novations which arose during the downward phase of the preceding wave. 
Breakthrough innovations provide space for the expansion of production and 
cause an inflow of investments. The wave is uprising. As a result, new econom-
ic sectors are formed which create a new technological mode. The latter ulti-
mately restructures the whole economy and eventually creates a new techno-
economic paradigm.14 Since it takes a long time for the innovations to spread, 
                                                          
13 Different researchers may give different attributes to the modes and paradigms (e.g., techno-
economic modes and technological paradigms), sometimes these concepts are used as synonyms, 
and sometimes as complementary definitions. In this article, the modes and paradigms are close-
ly related, but not identical concepts (see the note below). The closest equivalent terms, such as a 
technological system and technological style can also be applied.  
14 Developing the ideas of Carlotta Perez (2002) one should note that besides the new equipment  
and production technologies the techno-economic paradigm includes a new system of manage-
ment and business strategies and technologies, which is rooted not only among practicing busi-
nessmen, but also among economists as well as in broader strata of society. Therefore, one can 
assume that the mode is formed earlier and serves as the basis for the development of a para-
digm. And when the changes begin to affect a number of aspects, economic consciousness and a 
way of doing in society are fundamentally reshaped. According to Perez (Ibid.), this means the 
final paradigm shift. Sometimes one can also speak about the general purpose technologies 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995; Helpman 1998; for a detailed analysis of this theory, see Pol-
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and restructuring of economy needs time as well, this process takes up from  
20 to 30 years. The downward phase is related to the fact that the efficiency of 
the previous cluster of basic innovations decreases and new breakthrough tech-
nologies and technologies of wide application lag behind. As a result, it takes 
another 20–30 years until the core of the new technological mode is formed and 
a new wave starts. 
One can distinguish six modes (the sixth one is anticipated in the period 
from 2020 to the 2060/70s).15 The summarised scheme of K-waves and corre-
sponding technological modes is as follows: 
– the first wave (1780 – the end of the 1840s): textile industry; 
– the second wave (the end of 1840 – the 1890s): railway lines, coal, 
steel; 
– the third wave (1890 – the end of the 1940s): electricity, chemical 
industry and heavy engineering; 
– the fourth wave (the end of 1940s – the beginning of the 1980s):  auto-
mobile manufacturing, manmade materials, electronics; 
– the fifth wave (the beginning of the 1980s – ~ 2020): microelectronics, 
personal computers, biotechnologies;16 
– the sixth wave (c. 2020 – the 2060/70s), according to some assump-
tions, will be mostly associated with nano- and biotechnologies, as well 
as alternative power sources and new information technologies (see, 
e.g., Lynch 2004; Dator 2006). However, in our opinion, this mode will 
be much broader and particularly related to biomedical innovations (see 
above about MANBRIC-technologies and also see below). 
3.1.2. The disadvantages of the concept. The theories of the leading 
sector and macrosectors 
One should agree that the major systemic innovations which affect almost eve-
ry economic sectors and the general change of technological modes are the 
                                                                                                                                
terovich 2009). The meaning of this concept is close to the technological mode, but the meaning 
of the former concept is still narrower than the latter one, since there can be several general pur-
pose technologies within one mode. 
15 See, e.g., Schumpeter 1939; Freeman 1987; Rumyantseva 2003: 12–14; Glazyev 1993: 95–111; 
Ivanova 2003: 210; Papenhausen 2008: 789; Akayev et al. 2012. In fact, as in any classification 
there are numerous differences in the main characteristics of some or other modes, e.g., some re-
searchers ‘attribute’ such transitionary areas of innovations like automobile to the third wave, the 
others – to the fourth K-wave, etc. (see also the note below). 
16 Alternatively, the following definitions are used: the third Kondratieff wave was the age of steel, 
electricity, and heavy engineering. ‘The fourth wave takes in the age of oil, the automobile and 
mass production. Finally, the current fifth wave is described as the age of information and tele-
communications’ (Papenhausen 2008: 789). This is not surprising, since the life cycle of a new 
technological paradigm does not fit into one phase of the production principle (e.g., heavy engi-
neering developed since the 1830s and accompanied the whole Industrial production principle). 
The question, therefore, is at what phase this sector becomes an innovative leader.     
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most important factor setting the pace of development and change of K-
waves.17 The disadvantages of this theory are as follows: 
a) only production technologies are taken into account, as a result the 
change of the whole macrostructure of production, in particular its macro-sector 
and their ratio are ignored (see below); 
b) it hardly takes into account that a new mode does not just substitute the 
old one, but from the beginning also has an additive character, that is, new 
branches are added to the old ones. This significantly complicates the structure 
of production which in turn modifies the unfolding of both medium- and long-
term economic cycles; 
c) the theory insufficiently covers the multistructural character of economy 
both of individual countries and (especially) of the World-System where the 
technological waves first spread from the center to the nearest societies, then to 
semi-periphery, and then to the periphery, to the hinterland, etc.  
Let us consider these factors. First, one should note that these unaccounted 
aspects are taken into consideration in the theory of production principles, accord-
ing to which a new production system is first added to the previous one, compli-
cates it and only later begins to supersede it, but while expanding it uses the pe-
riphery as a supplier of products insufficiently produced in the centers of the new 
production principle. This is especially evident at the stages following the final 
phase of the production revolution. The first expansion involves the periphery 
precisely because of its subordinate position. In addition, the substitution of one 
production principle with another (or of the technologies of its early stages with 
later ones) necessarily leads to the change of types of production and fundamental 
demographic changes. 
The macrostructural change. Every new technological mode does not 
simply result in the emergence of new technologies (and respective branches), 
which at a certain stage begin to expel the old ones. It even ignores the fact that 
each wave and each structure either create a new macrosector, or transform the 
previous sector into the one, which acquires a fundamentally new significance. 
So, the period of the 1950–1970s is associated with an automobile, artificial 
materials, etc. And still this was the period marked by a most rapid growth of 
the service sector, which, for example, by 1980 provided employment to about 
two thirds of the American population including almost three quarters of wom-
                                                          
17 However, this explains only the mere fact of fluctuations, but not the stable temporal regularity of 
the upward and downward phases (20–30 years). The latter should have changed along with the 
acceleration of the scientific and technological progress. But this does not happen. The temporal 
regularity is explained by other factors, namely the connection between Kondratieff long and Ju-
glar medium-term cycles, since three medium-term cycles which have similar characteristics 
(their total duration is from 20 to 30 years) form either an upward or downward phase of the 
wave (for more details see Grinin 2010b; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2012, 2014; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch 2016).  
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en (World Bank 2019).18 Based on these shifts there was formed the theory of 
post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 1990). Let us consider the period from 1990 
to the 2000s, which is usually associated with computer technologies. However, 
on the whole the sector of complex (which includes not only programming) and 
financial services was growing most rapidly at that period.  
At a first glance it seems that the theory of the leading sector may reverse the 
situation. Different aspects of this theory were developed by S. Kuznets, W. Ros-
tow, J. van Duijn, J. van Golderen, G. Modelski, W. Thompson, J. Rennstich, etc. 
(Kuznets 1926, 1930; Rostow 1975; Duijn 1983; Modelski 1987; Modelski and 
Thompson 1996; Thompson 1990, 2000; Rasler and Thompson 1994; see also 
Modelski and Thompson 1992; Rennstich 2002). Sometimes one and the same 
author interprets the concept of the ‘leading sector’ differently in different con-
texts and aspects and far from always in a clear manner. In general, the leading 
sector appears as an advanced innovative sector of economy, which in fact consti-
tutes the backbone of what is also called a technological mode.19 Within the 
scope of this work we use the term ‘sector’ in a way similar to that used in  
the three-sector theory of C. Clark and A. Fisher (Clark 1957; Fisher 1939), in-
dustrial and post-industrial theory of J. Fourastie, R. Aron, and D. Bell (Fourastie 
1958; Aron 1967; Bell 1973): the primary sector includes agriculture and forest-
ry, the secondary sector – industry, the tertiary sector – a service sector, the qua-
ternary sector (which was later introduced) includes the companies providing 
information, communication, education and some other services. There already 
exists the term ‘quinary sector’ which includes the companies that provide 
healthcare services, culture and research. As we will see below (Tables 2 and 3), 
the quaternary and quinary sectors correlate with the fifth and sixth K-waves. 
3.1.3. The integration of macrosector theory and the theory of K-waves 
But still, the sectoral division does not completely reflect the formation pattern 
of the modes. In particular, there are disputes how the mining industry should 
be classified – in the primary or the secondary sector? To answer this question 
one should consider it from a historical point of view (the same way as we con-
sider K-waves). 
In general the historical formation pattern of macrosectors looked as fol-
lows: during the 16th – 18th centuries there appeared a new industrial sector 
which significantly differed from the handicraft industry. However, it was still 
based on manual labor, although machinery was used in the supplementary and 
secondary directions. In general the primary (agricultural) sector continued to 
                                                          
18 It is very difficult to single out the service sector especially from the historical perspective since 
there is a lot of disagreement about what types of activities could be included here (for more de-
tails see Hartwell 1976). 
19 For the analysis of ideas about the leading sector see Fomina 2005: 17–19, 28, 34 etc.; 
Rumyantseva 2009; Akayev et al. 2011, 2012; Gurieva 2005). 
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dominate, but the secondary sector was mainly growing at a higher rate. Never-
theless, the opportunities for its growth were limited. 
From the beginning of the final phase of the Industrial revolution the sec-
ondary sector began its fundamental transformation: with every K-wave there 
was a simultaneous transition from manual to machine labor in a number of 
industries and a large macro-sector was formed until the Industrial production 
principle realized itself fully and spatially. First, there appeared an industrial 
factory sector (mainly light industry), then the branches of the first processing 
cycle (steelmaking and iron smelting) and transport, and then the second pro-
cessing cycle (manufacturing, chemical industry, and heavy engineering) de-
velop especially rapidly. Every such expansion respectively increased the num-
ber of workers. This trend was common both in England and in other industrial-
ized countries yet with account that modernization was accelerated there.20  
We consider the leading macrosector as a set of the fastest growing 
sectors of economy which produce a high profit and thus attract capital. 
This set has the ability to accumulate a very large part of labor force. 
From the historical point of view we adhere to, there is a need to modify 
the macrosector division. Namely, to divide the industrial sector into three 
branches of industry (as they historically emerged): 1) factory (light) industry; 
2) heavy industry of the first cycle: mining and primary processing (associated 
with metal smelting, etc.) and transport; 3) heavy industry of the second cycle: 
manufacturing industry and heavy engineering. The advantage of this approach 
is that its scheme clearly reflects the logic of K-waves, when each wave has its 
own macrosector: 
the primary sector – agriculture and forestry;21 
the secondary sector  – light industry; 
the tertiary sector – mining and heavy industry of the first processing cycle; 
the quaternary sector – heavy industry of the second processing cycle (in-
cluding heavy mechanical engineering). 
With the formation of the Scientific-Cybernetic production principle one 
can observe a step-by-step establishment of the service sector and the increase 
in the number of employees in it, which reached almost 80 per cent in the US 
(World Bank 2019).22 And this led to the emergence of: 
                                                          
20 In this case, we always ignore the coexisting and simultaneously developing sectors and focus on 
the fact that the leading sector develops most rapidly and becomes the most profitable thus, con-
centrating large amounts of capital.  
21 This sector was dominant, and thus, leading prior to the Industrial revolution. 
22 Thus, in the course of unfolding Industrial, and then Scientific-Cybernetic production principles, 
first the formation of a new macrosector takes place and then, as the production principle devel-
ops, this sector grows until new sectors evolve from it. It is necessary to take into consideration 
that the Scientific-Cybernetic production principle is now at its second phase, i.e., still in an  
early stage, whereas the Industrial production principle in 1830 – the 1890s was already at  
the fourth (maturity) phase. In this context, the modern service sector typologically resembles the 
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the quinary sector  – the sector of general services;23 
the senary sector – the sector of complex (highly-qualified services) ser-
vices; 
the septenary sector – the sector of services of self-regulating systems (see 
below). 
The scheme of correspondence of the leading sector and K-waves: 
the first K-wave: the sector of factory (light) industry; 
the second K-wave: the sector of mining and primary (first processing cy-
cle) heavy industry and transport (coal and iron ore mining, iron smelting, 
railway services, etc.); 
the third K-wave: the sector of secondary heavy industry (including chemi-
cal, electrical, etc.) and mechanical engineering (including heavy, transport, 
electrical, automobile manufacturing);24 
the fourth K-wave: the sector of  services (with a predominance of less-
qualified services); 
the fifth K-wave: the sector of highly-qualified services (financial, infor-
mational, scientific, educational, and medical ones; these services were separat-
ed from a single service sector of the fourth K-wave). 
However, one should take into account that every new macro-sector creates 
new layers of economy within whose structure one can observe not a mere 
change of one mode by another but a complex restructuring, redistribution of 
capital flows and resources, including labor force. As a result all the macro-
sectors remain in the structure; however, some of them may thrive and develop 
dynamically whereas others would stagnate. Thus, the formation, development 
and change of macro-sectors allow clarifying the logic of development of the 
production principle. New macro-sectors mostly emerge and develop as sup-
plementary ones, aimed at serving the leading sector. It is generally accepted 
that the technological mode of ‘railway lines, coal and steel’ refers to the sec-
ond K-wave. However, the rapid formation of this mode began in England (as 
well as in a number of European countries) at the B-phase of the first wave 
since it was impossible to provide growth without sharp increase in shipment 
and fuel supply. Mechanical engineering was developing during the transition 
to the industrial (i.e., machine) technologies of certain – the most promising, 
fast growing and profitable – branches of industry without affecting other 
                                                                                                                                
secondary (industrial) sector before the Industrial revolution (which is described above). Appar-
ently, after the completion of the Cybernetic revolution it will be transformed as radically as the 
working class in the 19th century if compared with the 18th century. 
23 The sector of services appeared a very long time ago, starting with the emergence of institutional-
ized inequality and a stratified (class) society. But during the Industrial period, this sector un-
derwent significant changes which in the post-war period led to dramatic changes in the em-
ployment structure (for more details see Hartwell 1976). 
24 In this context there is no contradiction that a motor vehicle can be included either in the third  
or in the fourth wave.  
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branches of industrу. Primary heavy industry (coal and iron ore mining, iron, 
steel and non-ferrous metals smelting) increased due to the necessity to provide 
materials for the rapidly growing industry, and respectively, construction and 
transport needs (as well as military needs). It is very important that within the 
macro-sector the industrial branches were mutually supporting: metallurgy 
needed coal, and in turn coal mining needed metal. But as primary heavy indus-
try grew, it turned out that, first, the development of technology for obtaining 
cheaper (high-quality) materials opened up new opportunities for their export, 
and secondly, there were discovered new huge niches of their application. The 
development vector made the previously subsidiary sector to become the lead-
ing macrosector, and simultaneously formed the forthcoming leading macro-
sector, the latter remaining a subsidiary one for a while. It is worth mentioning 
that the fifth sector of complex services will be actively developing in the next 
two decades not so much in the World-System center but in its periphery. Not 
without reason, the analysts predict a rapid growth of the middle class in the 
developing countries and in the world as a whole up to two billion people by 
2030 (NIC 2012). 
Table 2. K-waves, technological modes and leading macro-sectors  
Kon-
dratieff 
Wave 
Date A New Mode  
Leading  
Macrosector 
Production 
Principle  
and Number 
of Its Phase  
The  
First  
1780– 
the 1840s 
The textile industry Factory (consum-
er) industry 
Industrial, 3 
The  
Second 
1840– 
the 1890s 
Railway lines, coal, 
steel  
Mining industry and 
primary heavy in-
dustry and transport 
Industrial, 4 
The 
Third 
1890– 
the 1940s 
Electricity, chemi-
cal industry and 
heavy engineering 
Secondary heavy 
industry and me-
chanic engineering 
Industrial, 5/6 
The 
Fourth 
1940-е – 
the early 
1980s 
Automobile manu-
facturing, manmade 
materials, electronics
General services  Industrial, 6, 
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 1 
The 
Fifth 
the 1980s 
–~2020 
Micro-electronics, 
personal computers
Highly-qualified 
services 
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 
1/2  
The 
Sixth 
the 2020/ 
30s –  
the 2050/ 
60s 
MANBRIC-techno-
logies (med-bio-
nano-robo-info-
cognitive) 
Medical human 
services  
 
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 
2/3 
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3.1.4. The leading sector, the change of production principles and the 
sixth K-wave 
It is important to note that while the first three K-waves have technological 
modes and leading sectors significantly correlating in their names, the situation 
is different with respect to the last two K-waves: new modes lead to the crea-
tion of sectors that significantly differ from the typical industrial ones. This is 
no coincidence at all since it marks the transition from the Industrial to the Sci-
entific-Cybernetic production principle. That is the reason why the explanation 
of the significant changes in the vector of the leading sectors starting from the 
post-war period needs the theory of the production principles. The latter em-
phasizes the changing activities as a part of total changes which occur in two 
cases: 1) as a result of the initial phase of the Industrial revolution, when a fun-
damentally different (and much more productive) type of economic activity 
arises which has a large economic niche; 2) when this type of economic acti- 
vity acquires mature features as a result of the completion of the Industrial rev-
olution. Since the final phase of the Cybernetic revolution may start during the 
sixth wave one can assume that the core of the new leading sector will be 
formed by the self-regulating systems services (with medical and biological, 
humanitarian services at its core).25 This sector will become especially im-
portant at the downward phase of the sixth K-wave (2060 – the 2070s) and will 
continue to develop beyond this wave. 
Table 3. The sixth K-wave: expected technological mode and leading 
sector 
Kon-
dratieff 
Wave 
Date A New Mode  
Leading  
Macrosector 
Production 
Principle  
and Number  
of Its Phase  
The 
Sixth 
the 2020/ 
30s –  
the 2050/  
60s 
MANBRIC-techno-
logies (medical-
additive-nano-bio-
robo-info-cognitive) 
Medical human 
services  
 
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 
2/3 
During the unfolding revolution of ‘self-regulating systems’, as mentioned 
above, there should take place the transition to various technologies which will 
be aimed at creating different (in size and complexity) self-controlled, self-
                                                          
25 Humanitarian services in a broad sense aimed not only at intellectual services but also at main-
taining the physical and mental human existence by organizing various conditions, influencing 
social and recreational systems as well as increasing control capabilities of previously uncon-
trolled physiological processes, which also refer to medical services (e.g., associated with the 
population ageing, with the adaptation of people with disabilities due to the creation of artificial 
organs or receptors of new cognitive systems to control health, etc.). But these services will be 
provided within the whole complex of MANBRIC technologies. 
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regulating and self-adjusting systems. Accordingly, they will be used to control 
and regulate all kinds of industrial, household, medical, natural and biological 
processes and various needs of people, including producers and consumers. 
Thus, a whole cluster of general-purpose technologies can emerge here (GPTs). 
In particular, the technologies used for individual production services (on a by-
order basis) may become very popular. These technologies allow the implementa-
tion of a variety of individual plans and projects (so-called 3D printing can appear 
a prototype of such technologies in some ways). There will be also created vari-
ous individual programs by order to ensure the most optimal mode (physiologi-
cal, physical load, etc.) taking into account the individual characteristics of a cus-
tomer, local territory, etc. It should be emphasized that providing biomedical hu-
manitarian services will increasingly be implemented by self-regulating systems 
including robots. Besides, under completion of the fifth K-wave in the 2020s and 
in the process of growth of the sector of complex services there may start a no-
ticeable process of replacing simple and less complex services due to new tech-
nologies associated with ‘smart’ technologies.  
By the end of the 21st century one will probably talk about the technologies 
for creating individual genetic programmes. 
In other words, the focus of the leading sectors of economy will be shifted 
from the sphere of industrial occupation that we got used to and will be directed 
towards the fields that were not previously economic at all or were slightly  
related to the economy. This will eventually lead to the disappearance of  
K-waves as one of the forms of unfolding technologies. 
3.1.5. On the peculiarities of the change of the leading sector and econo- 
mic paradigm 
Thus, during the first three K-waves, in accordance with the logic of develop-
ment of the Industrial production principle, there occurred the transition from 
the agrarian and manufacturing and handicraft macrosectors to the industrial 
macrosector which gradually expanded. First, there appears the sector of the 
factory industry (light industry), then – the sector of mining and primary heavy 
industry (with a new transport subsector), and finally the sector of the second-
ary heavy industry, including mechanical engineering. This logic manifested in 
the so-called Kondratieff's ‘third regularity’ (2002 [1926]: 376–379), according 
to which the downward phases of (the first three) K-waves are followed by the 
long depression of agriculture.26 The depression was expressed in a rather sharp 
drop in prices for agricultural products. Why did it happen just at the downward 
B-phases? N. D. Kondratieff explains this by the fact that agriculture is less 
flexible to falling prices and more difficult to adjust (Kondratieff 1928). More-
                                                          
26 S. Kuznets in his works (1926, 1930) also pays considerable attention to the relationship between 
two sectors: agricultural and industrial. During the period when the prices on agricultural pro-
duction dropped significantly, a lot of people were concerned with these problems. 
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over, it is clear that in the conditions of industrial growth the demand for agri-
cultural products (food and raw materials) increases, and respectively one can 
observe the rise in prices, whereas during the depression the demand decreases 
(because it is the city that determines the market capacity).27 At the same time, 
due to the inflexible agricultural supply, the decline rate may be even larger 
than in industry. After all, the reduction in cultivated areas and decline in pro-
duction proceed much more difficult than in industry, besides many producers 
are the owners or tenants and they cannot reduce the labor force participation, 
as in case with the employees in factories. It is interesting to note that agricul-
ture of that period was less subjected to fluctuations of the medium-term Juglar 
cycles (which is confirmed by the purely industrial nature of the latter), but it is 
more susceptible to long depressive periods (expelling small-scale production) 
fitting the duration of the downward phases of K-waves. In addition in the last 
decades of the 19th century the development of transport triggered a rapid 
growth of the world agricultural market (especially corn market) which 
strengthened the deflationary trend. 
The B-phases of K-waves are the periods of more active expansion of the 
center to the periphery and more active involvement of the periphery into  
the economic relations of the center. The involvement of the (primarily agricul-
tural) resources of the periphery could increase the supply and, accordingly 
strengthened the deflationary trend. For example, the considerable decline in 
wool prices especially after 1825 (see Kondratieff 2002 [1926]: 377, Table 2), 
is explained largely by the tremendous increase in wool imports from Australia to 
England, which increased from 1.8 million pounds to almost 30 million pounds in 
the period from 1829 to 1848 and exceeded by two times the indicators of the 
previously leading import of wool from Germany (Malakhovsky 1971: 46).  
Let us mention some important provisions related to the paradigm shifts. 
First, it should be noted that the leading sector of the next wave is formed with-
in the current one, and the leading sector of the preceding wave by the volume 
produced in the current wave can take the leading position. Thus, one can ob-
serve several generations of innovations at the same time. For example, during 
the fourth K-wave (1939–1984) the following technologies were actively de-
veloped: 
• automobile and electrical engineering, including household appliances, 
which reached their peak during the third wave; 
• production of artificial materials, automation, non-computer electronics 
(leading sectors of the fourth wave); 
• computer technologies (the main technologies in the future fifth wave); 
                                                          
27 Nevertheless, it is less clear with respect to the B-phase of the first wave (in particular, between 
1816 and the 1840s). Although, one should certainly take into account that prices were decreas-
ing from a sufficiently high level of the military (Napoleonic) period. 
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• the technology of the third wave (heavy engineering) and even of the 
second (mining, metal smelting, etc.). 
Second. It should be clearly understood that there is no single rhythm in 
the course of changing of one wave of innovation (technological mode) by an-
other. Sometimes a new wave of innovation rushes when the previous one has 
not yet subsided, and this results in a higher rise in the upward phase of the 
Kondratieff cycle (this explains very high GDP growth rates in 1950 –  
the 1960s). And sometimes, just on the contrary, the new wave is delayed,  
and the previous one is already exhausting itself, then the rise in the upward 
phase of the Kondratieff cycle is weaker (this explains the weaker rise, espe-
cially in the center of the World-System in the 2000s). Thus, each shift has im-
portant features which are substantially determined by the rhythm of production 
revolutions and by the phase of the production principle of any given wave or 
phase (these details are analyzed below). 
Third. It is necessary to mention the important features of the paradigm 
shift model which have remained unnoticed.28 In fact, we should talk about 
different types of ‘behavior’ of the paradigm at its initial and mature phases. To 
be more precise, as long as a new paradigm is formed and developed, the result 
for the old paradigm will not be fatal, but rather positive. But when a mode 
transforms into the paradigm, its ‘behavior’ towards its predecessor becomes 
aggressive and intolerable. By the way, one should understand this when taking 
into account the development of the sixth technological mode which will start 
to form on the basis of the technologies related to self-regulating systems (first 
of all, as we have already mentioned, in the field of bio-medical, humanitarian 
services). Though until now these new technologies do not face any serious 
opponents, but subsequently this may cause strong resistance. We can easily 
imagine this in respect to the electric and self-driving cars. Taking a secondary 
position, a small niche, they serve a kind of advertising to automotive and other 
concerns, distract attention from the problems of ordinary cars, and open a new 
niche for investment. But just imagine the widespread introduction of self-driving 
cars and the replacement of not only taxi drivers, but also truck drivers, the actual 
depreciation of the cost of a huge car fleet and eventually the displacement of the 
old auto giants. Probably, it will cause massive protests and the increase of real 
and imaginary fears, split in society, etc.  
Let us consider in more detail different ‘behavior’ of a new mode at different 
phases. During the first half of the way the formation and strengthening of a new 
mode leads not so much to the replacement of the old paradigm, but rather to 
strengthening it by means of expanding and including those branches which need 
to be developed. Therefore, there is a loyal attitude to innovations. This is also 
                                                          
28 Despite the fact that C. Perez (2002) paid much attention to the analysis of the paradigm shift in 
her monograph, she did not take into account the fact that the new paradigm behaves differently 
in different periods of its expansion which leads to different consequences. 
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explained by the fact that new technologies appear not simply ‘out of the blue’, 
but as a need for certain services and goods (e.g., in case of inefficient technolo-
gies or low capacity technologies or their high cost, etc.). Thus, during the initial 
phase new technologies replace the old ones to a lesser extent, but to a greater 
extent supplement them. For quite a long time, new technologies threaten only a 
relatively small part of the economy. Herewith, this creates a kind of symbiosis 
between old and new technologies. For example, for more than two decades the 
cotton spinning factories coexisted with numerous craftsmen.29 And the number 
of hand weavers during the first period of the Industrial revolution even signifi-
cantly increased and their economic situation was quite satisfactory (see, e.g., 
Mendelson 1959; Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]). As early as in 1831 (i.e., 
many years after the invention of the power loom by William Horrocks), in Eng-
land, hand weavers accounted for more than 80 %, and factory weavers – less 
than 20 % (Tseytlin 1940).  C. Perez gives an illustrative example of such a tem-
porary expansion of the old sector due to the growth of the new one, taking this 
situation as an inexplicable ‘strangeness’ rather than a regularity. She notes, 
‘Strange as it may appear, the number of horses increased over the next fifty 
years (after the start of the construction of railways. – L. G.) due to the increased 
need for transport from railways and ships to homes’ (Perez 2011: 66, note 1). 
But there is nothing strange about it. Just on the contrary, this is how the situation 
develops in many cases. With the introduction of oil coal mining increased. With 
the introduction of plastic metal smelting increased.  Today, with the increase  
in the number of computers, paper production is still growing, but the time will 
come, and it will slow down with the reduction in the production of paper books, 
newspapers and paper products.30 
A new mode which transforms into a new techno-economic paradigm at 
the peak of its development begins to manifest itself much more aggressively. 
Growth opportunities, i.e. supplements to the old paradigm have already been 
exhausted, so the replacement of the old technologies takes place. Additive 
characteristics are increasingly giving way to substitutive ones. Thus, by the 
mid-1840s there were 60,000 hand weavers for 150,000 machine weavers, and 
fifteen years later hand weaving in England almost completely disappeared 
(Tseytlin 1940). But a complete paradigm shift can only be achieved through 
the restructuring of society. Restructuring occurs primarily due to the fact that 
                                                          
29 The famous spinning ‘Jenny’ (by James Hargreaves) with the invention of which the beginning 
of the Industrial revolution in the late 1760s is associated did not destroy the home system of 
spinning at all. On the contrary, due to the lack of a mechanical engine it spread mainly in small-
scale handicraft production, thus, at first even strengthening it. In 1788 there were about 20,000 
‘Jennies’ in England scattered throughout the small spinning workshops and the houses of vil-
lage spinners (see Tseytlin 1940). 
30 The paper print production, by the way, was also growing for a long time along with the increase 
in the amount of electronic information, and for two decades newspapers have been presented in 
two formats. Only in recent years there is a crisis in the book publishing industry. 
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the old industries, without leaving physically together with the old paradigm 
start decaying. Their profitability decreases, as a result of which capital assets 
move to the branches of the new paradigm. After that, sometimes gradually and 
imperceptibly, and sometimes dramatically and revolutionarily, the process of 
changing views, institutions, preferences, etc. takes place.  
The change of technological modes and techno-economic paradigms is a 
long process which takes place both at the upward and downward phases, but 
due to the characteristics of the phases themselves and their medium-term cy-
cles the nature of this change is somewhat different. Due to the general rise and 
inflationary trend, figuratively speaking, there is more space at the upward 
phases, so it is easier for the old sectors to hold the position in such general 
upward movement. The higher demand makes even products created in the old 
way cost-effective. Thus, at the upward A-phases of K-waves, the effect of 
changing modes and sectors is more additive and less substitutive than at the 
downward phases. The deflationary trend, while significantly reducing the rate 
of return, is more severe with respect to outdated technologies. Therefore, at the 
downward B-phases, the effect of changing modes, sectors and paradigms usu-
ally appears to be more noticeable and more severe. Lower demand, lower 
prices and lower rates of return, given that many costs cannot be reduced, even 
in the conditions of depression, are forcing entrepreneurs to search for ways to 
increase efficiency and productivity. The change of equipment and technolo-
gies as a whole is the most important in this situation. Therefore, at the down-
ward B-phases of K-waves, the effect of changing modes and sectors is more 
substitutive and less additive than at the upward A-phases.31  
3.1.6. The change of technological modes as their increasing diversity 
The economy of every country is known to comprise different sectors, starting 
with agriculture (but the level of technological development of the sectors de-
pends on the general level of the economy: the higher it is, the more equal is the 
technological level of the sectors). The increasing diversity of modes in the 
economy of each country (i.e., the coexistence of three or four paradigms with-
in one economy) was not taken into consideration while analyzing the devel-
opment of K-waves). 
However, if in a particular sector of the economy a sector that is no longer 
a leading sector very rarely becomes a leading one,32 then within the global 
economy, due to the international division of labor, the situation is different. 
The reason is that the former technologically leading sectors, when leaving the 
                                                          
31 Weaker deflation due to the complete abandonment of the gold standard in the last 40 years, 
however, has not eliminated the problems of decreasing demand and profit. But during the last 
three or four years' deflation has returned, as well as all the problems inherent in the period of 
falling prices. 
32 This may happen, e.g. if a country specializes in agricultural production as in case with New 
Zealand or in mining industry as in oil-producing countries. 
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World System Core, move to other parts of the World System, not as leaders 
with the prefix ‘ex-’ but as actual leaders.33 First, this occurs in underdeveloped 
countries via the development of their own production in the ex-leading sectors 
by means of adopted (imported) technologies. Second, this happens due to the 
actual transfer of old sectors to the less-developed countries (as has already 
been mentioned, this process has been going on during the last two or three 
decades within the process of the deindustrialization of the West). Thus, the 
structure of the international division of labor which is generally the World 
System's most important axis reflects the historical succession of leading sec-
tors to a certain extent and makes it possible for a new mode of production to 
emerge in the World System core. The last aspect is taken into consideration 
insufficiently.  
But the new wave of technologies requires not only an innovation cluster 
but also a ‘free space’ in the leading countries in order to re-orient the work 
force. While capital and labor are being reoriented, the old basic commodities 
should be produced elsewhere in sufficient quantity so that the economy with 
an emerging new leading sector could have more opportunities. This means that 
it should get rid of the less-innovative commodities. Otherwise, in the situation 
of basic commodities shortage, it would be more difficult to concentrate on 
innovative ones which, despite their importance, becomes less connected with 
people's basic needs (compare food, clothes, and even metals, on the one hand, 
with Internet and specific services, on the other). Such a release becomes pos-
sible due to the import of goods whose production becomes unprofitable. Far 
from everything is logical here; the process of transformation proceeds with 
difficulty, but the logic of the process contributes to the World System's eco-
nomic growth and provides opportunities for innovative breakthroughs in dif-
ferent regions of the World System. In fact, this is a way to introduce new 
economies into the operating arena of a new production principle. Even if a 
number of societies do not fit the principle yet (as at present many countries of 
the world do not really achieve the appropriate level for the Scientific-
Cybernetic production principle), anyway to a certain extent they are getting 
involved in it (at least in large cities where there already exist some advanced 
technology centers). Moreover, they become a part of the international division 
of labor which is formed under the influence of a new production principle. 
Therefore, the adaptation of new waves of innovations should be supported by 
technology and capital transfer to the less developed parts of the World System 
                                                          
33 This is true even with regard to agriculture if considering, e.g. the way it was developing during 
the last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century in the colonized terri-
tories of the West: USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and also Argentina, Russia and India 
to a certain extent. In other words the primary sector began to develop in the territories where it 
already existed, but transformed from non-commodity to commodity, or in the areas where a ‘ze-
ro’ sector used to be (we mean hunting, gathering), or even in uninhabited areas. 
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in order to compensate for the volume and range of commodities not produced 
anymore in the core. It should be noted that such restructuring in the form of 
intensively growing sectors of economy is observed not only at the upward 
phases of K-waves. We can also notice that in the downward phases of  
K-waves there are also economies or their groups that grow faster than the cen-
ter. This can be explained by the increased export of technology and capital in 
such periods. Such economies either present the periphery of the World-
System, which is transforming into its semi-periphery, or countries and regions 
competing with the center.34 As we have already mentioned, the most active 
expansion of the center to the periphery is accounted for the downward phases 
of K-waves (see also Korotayev and Grinin 2012; Grinin, Korotayev, and 
Tausch 2016). New economic strategies can also be formed during the down-
ward phases of K-waves, which make it possible to provide a definite break-
through for lagging countries. The development model through state planning 
which was implemented by different countries, starting with Germany of Bis-
marck's time and Japan after the Meiji Restoration Era to the USSR can be con-
sidered one of such strategies; and the other strategy is the East Asian model, 
originally created in Japan during the A-phase of the fourth wave (1950–1970), 
but which transformed during the downward phase of that wave since the late 
1960s in South Korea, in Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Now this model 
is being successfully implemented into other societies. 
Note that the complete cycle of such transfers in the world has a duration 
substantially exceeding the length of one K-wave. So, the transition of the tex-
tile industry (the oldest of the industrial ones) has not yet been completed: Chi-
na passes the baton to Bangladesh, Vietnam and some other countries, and then 
somewhere else (e.g., a few decades later to the countries of tropical Africa, un-
less technological development makes ineffective the use of cheap labor in it). 
Thus, in some cases this process is taking place occurs throughout three or four 
K-waves, basically coinciding with the duration of the production principle. 
Taking into consideration the abovementioned, the delay in the deployment 
of a new innovation cluster may be related to the fact that the structure of the 
World-System itself is not absolutely prepared for this. The degree of its readi-
ness largely depends on the characteristics of the phase of the production prin-
ciple at which it is now being developed. 
                                                          
34 Thus, during the downward phase of the second K-wave (1873–1895) England experienced  
a severe economic depression, whereas the economy of such countries as the United States and 
Germany beginning to claim the role of a new center in Europe, and also the ‘white’ British colo-
nies continued to grow. Countries with a totalitarian economic system developed rather quickly  
at the downward phase of the third K-wave (in the 1930s). The so-called ‘Asian tigers’ and then 
China appeared at the downward phase of the fourth K-wave (1970 – the 1980s). And the economy 
of many developing countries successfully grows at the downward phase of the fifth K-wave. 
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Instead of Conclusion. The Industrial Revolution and the 
Formation of the System of Industrial Cycles 
We have compared some aspects of the theory of the production principles 
and K-waves. Typically, the idea of changing macro-sectors rather successfully 
may complete both theories. If it is assumed that the production principle is a 
cycle consisting of the initial phase, development of the new system of technol-
ogies and production, its maturity, and then the emergence of the new non-
system elements indicating the possibility of transition to a new production prin-
ciple, then such a cycle can also be shown as a process of the formation of new 
macro-sectors, which are closely related to the long-wave dynamics. First, there 
appear new revolutionary technologies that lead to the formation of the important 
sectors with a new approach to economic management. These sectors, as we have 
seen, for quite a long period of time become ‘surplus’, supplement to the old 
ones. Then the new generations of technologies of the young production principle 
are introduced, which bring its characteristics to maturity, extend them to new 
branches until it becomes absolutely dominant. Further there emerge the genera-
tions of technologies, providing the possibility of transition to a new production 
principle. 
The application of a comparative method also allowed understanding the 
nature and driving forces of K-waves on a global scale. In particular, we have 
seen that the Kondratieff cycles are one of the most important forms of im-
plementing the Industrial production principle (which is implemented in the 
form of waves of innovative development of the economy). This indicates that 
K-waves (at least in economics) cannot be considered as independent phe-
nomena that can be applied absolutely to any period and process. The fact 
that their appearance was caused by the emergence of a new type of produc-
tive forces makes it possible to see their similarity with other economic cy-
cles. 
It is no coincidence that the first clear manifestations of the long-wave pro-
cesses of economic dynamics coincided with the Industrial revolution, namely 
the 1780s (see, e.g., Grinin 2007a; Grinin and Korotayev 2015a). We can as-
sume that the transition to machine industry created the phenomenon of Kon-
dratieff waves (or K-waves) in the economy (or allowed at least the ability to 
see them clearly).   
During the completion of the Industrial revolution (i.e., during the last third 
of the 18th century), the productive forces began to acquire a new fundamental 
characteristics – ‘a desire’ for a steady and annual expansion (on this character-
istics see, e.g., Kuznets 1966; Gellner 1983; Abramovitz 1961; Grinin 2007a, 
2006а, 2010, 2012b, 2013а; Grinin and Korotayev 2010, 2012). The emergence 
of this property led to the emergence of various forms of cyclical dynamics 
connected with various limitations (that hinder such an expansion) and attempts 
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to overcome them. This forward movement, of course, could not be uniform, 
and must obey different rhythms; their common property was the alteration of 
acceleration and deceleration phases caused by the exhaustion of available re-
sources for growth, market saturation, reduced profit margins and so on.  
Innovations have become the most important way to overcome different 
obstacles. Herewith, various forms of cyclicity appeared, whereas the long-
wave cyclic dynamics (with each cycle more and more clearly associated with 
innovations) became the first such cyclic form of development. Another form, 
more visible and more recognized by economists was the medium-term Juglar 
cycles, ending with a more or less severe cyclical crisis. The first cycle of such 
kind can be dated to 1818–1825. It is rather symptomatic that this cycle oc-
curred after the completion of the upswing phase of the first K-wave. Thus, 
both the Kondratieff long waves and medium-term Juglar cycles are associated 
with the same fundamental change – the transition to a new pattern of devel-
opment of production, i.e. extended production based not only the involvement 
of new resources but also on new technologies. The above mentioned further 
strengthens the idea that K-waves may be fully realized only through the medi-
um-term cycles.35 We will continue to develop this subject in the second article.  
One can also note that the relationship between the long and medium-term 
cycles, on the one hand, and the tendency of the modern productive forces to-
ward their continued expansion, on the other, has a common denominator, 
which includes innovation as an important component. Hence it is evident that 
both types of the economic cycle associated with a longer (and deeper) cyclic 
change of the productive forces – production revolutions that are leading to the 
movement from one principle of production to another. Kondratieff called  
the long waves the cycles of conjuncture, since these fluctuations were clearly 
traced in the dynamics of prices (prices are determined by supply and demand, 
i.e., the conjuncture). However, medium-term cycles are subject to the influ-
ence of short-term economic changes to a much greater extent than the long 
ones (at the same time, they are significantly shorter than the short Kitchin cy-
cles of 3 and 4 years). 
One of the main reasons for changing the trend of Kondratieff waves, as it 
is shown in various studies (see above), is the development and implementation 
of large clusters of basic innovations (the pace of the emergence and the spre- 
ad of which also resemble waves), leading to the change in the economic and 
technological paradigm. The medium-term cycles and cyclical crises are to a 
large extent associated with fluctuations in amount of investment and benefits 
from them, some of which are beneficial, and others are not. At the same time, 
                                                          
35 Since the depression years of medium-term cycles altogether determine the overall downward 
trend at the downward phases of K-waves, whereas aggregated booms of medium-term cycles 
determine the upward dynamics (for more details see Grinin 2010; Grinin and Korotaev 2012). 
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major innovations are being introduced very unevenly in economy, first in cer-
tain enterprises, then in certain branches, etc. Investment flows in the process of 
going through medium-term cycles undergo selection: less successful are elim-
inated and more successful continue to develop. Therefore, the medium-term 
cycles are associated with the involvement and exhaustion of resources for de-
velopment on the one hand, as well as price and speculative bubbles (and their 
connection with K-waves is already shown in aggregates of price changes dur-
ing a certain period), on the other hand – with long-term investments and bene-
fits from them, in this respect they are structural units that create the K-wave 
(again in the context of innovations, i.e. long-term investments). 
On the whole both medium and long cycles are the means of development 
since the latter is a cycle of replacing of one production organization model (agri-
cultural model, based on manual labor and using animal power) by another one 
(industrial model, based on mechanized labor using water power and steam). At 
the same time the cycle of the industrial production principle beginning from its 
origin to completion included several techno-economic paradigms. In the course 
of any of these economic cycles, structural technological and social contradic-
tions in certain societies and in the World System are overcome. 
Our research into the connection between the theories of production princi-
ples and long cycles will be continued in the next issue of Kondratieff Waves. 
Announcement of the Second Article 
Correlation of the phases of the Industrial production principle and  
K-waves. In two tables (4 and 5) below we show a certain and quite significant 
correlation between K-waves and phases of the Industrial and Scientific-
Cybernetic production principles. Certainly, there can be no direct duration 
equivalence of both K-waves and their phases, on the one hand, and the phases 
of production principles – on the other hand (see Table 4). However, we have 
succeeded in establishing a more complex ratio according to which at the aver-
age one K-wave correlates with one phase of the Industrial or Scientific-
Cybernetic production principles. On the whole beginning from the 1760s and 
ending in the 2060s, six and a half K-waves coincide with six and a half phases 
of the Industrial and Scientific-Cybernetic production principles, although some 
phases coincide with one and a half wave, and some – only with half a wave. 
As should be clear to the reader, such a correlation is not coincidental, as inno-
vative development of the Industrial and Scientific-Cybernetic production prin-
ciple is realized through long Kondratieff cycles which are largely defined by 
large-scale innovations. 
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Table 4. The Phases of the Industrial production principle and Kon-
dratieff waves36  
Phases of the 
Industrial 
Production 
Principle  
The Third 
Phase,  
1730–1830 
≈ 100 years 
The Fourth 
Phase,  
1830–1890
≈ 60 years
The Fifth 
Phase, 
1890–1929
≈ 40 years
The Sixth 
Phase,  
1929–1955
≈ 25 years
Total:  
≈ 225 years, 
from 
1760 – 
195 years 
The Number 
of the 
K-wave 
Zero  
(В-Phase) / 
The First 
Wave 
(А-Phase), 
1760–1817 
– about 60
years 
The End of 
the First 
Wave / 
The Second 
Wave, 
1817–1895 
– more than
75 years
The Third 
Wave, 
The Up-
ward Phase,
1895–1928 
– more than
35 years 
Third wave,
The Down- 
ward Phase, 
1929–1947 
– about 20
years 
About  
190 years 
The Phase  
of K-wave 
B-Phase of 
the Zero 
Wave,37 
1760–1787 
The Second 
half of the 
Downward 
Phase, 
1817–1849 
The Up-
ward Phase, 
1895–1928 
The Down-
ward Phase, 
1929–1947 
The Phase  
of K-wave 
The Up-
ward Phase, 
1787–1817  
The Up-
ward Phase, 
1849–1873 
The Phase  
of K-wave 
The Down-
ward Phase, 
1873–1895 
As regards the Industrial principle of production, it should be noted that the 
beginning of the B-phase of the zero K-wave did not coincide with the 
very beginning of the third phase of this production principle (but with the pe-
riod closer to the middle of it), so it can be assumed that three and a half waves 
coincide with three and a half phases of the Industrial production principle! 
The fourth, fifth and sixth K-wave coincide with the first three phases of 
the Scientific-Cybernetic production principle. The sixth wave mainly corre-
sponds to its third phase. We assume that the sixth wave, which will begin in 
the 2020s, will then be reinforced by the final phase of the revolution of self-
regulating systems and thus its A-phase will be as powerful as the A-phase of 
36 For simplicity, we take specific years for the beginning and end of the phases, although it is clear 
that such a transition takes place within a certain period. 
37 We took as the beginning a zero K-wave which downward phase coincided with the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution, i.e. the 1760s (as we know, it is downward phases that are especially 
rich in innovations). 
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the fourth K-wave, and its B-phase will be less depressing and shorter due to 
unexpended innovations. 
Thus, three phases of the Scientific-Cybernetic production principle coin-
cide with three K-waves (the fourth and sixth). This correlation is even more 
significant due to reduction of duration of the phase of the Scientific-
Cybernetic production principle.  
Table 5. The Scientific-Cybernetic production principle (initial phases) 
and Kondratieff waves  
Phases 
of the  
Scientific-
Cybernetic 
Production 
Principle 
The first phase 
(initial phase of 
the Cybernetic 
Revolution) 
1955–1995 
 
 
≈ 40 years 
The second 
phase (middle 
phase of the 
Cybernetic Rev-
olution) 
1995 – the 
2030s/40s. 
≈ 35–50 years 
The third phase 
(final phase of ‘self- 
regulating systems’ 
of the Cybernetic 
Revolution) 
the 2030s/40s – 
the 2055/70s 
≈ 25–40 years
Total: 
≈ 100–
120 
years 
 
K-Wave 
and Their 
Phases  
The Fourth 
Wave,  
1947 – 
1982/1991 
 
 
 
 
 
≈ 35–45 years
The Fifth Wave, 
1982/1991 – 
the 2020s. 
The beginning 
of the upward 
phase of the 
sixth wave 
(2020–  
the 2050s) 
≈ 30–40 years
The sixth wave, 
2020 – 2060/70s. 
The end of the up-
ward phase and 
downward phase 
(the latter ≈ 2050 – 
2060/70s) 
 
 
≈ 40–50 years
About 
110– 
120 
years 
K-Wave 
and Their 
Phases  
Upward phase, 
1947 – 
1969/1974s 
Downward 
phase of the fifth 
wave, 2007– 
the 2020s 
  
K-Wave 
and Their 
Phases 
Downward 
phase,  
1969/1974 – 
1982/1991 
Upward phase 
of the sixth 
wave, 2020– 
the 2050s. 
  
K-Wave 
and Their 
Phases 
The fifth wave, 
1982/1991 – 
the 2020s,  
upward phase, 
1982/1991 – 
2007 
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